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Introduction
Holding  governments  accountable  and  ensuring  a 
meaningful  scrutiny  and  significant  control  over  the   
executive branch is a challenge for many parliaments. The 
difficulty is enhanced when national parliaments seek to have 
an impact on policy activities occurring at European level. 
The role of national parliaments in the European integration 
process has received a lot of scholarly and political attention 
since the mid 90’s and has become closely linked to the   
debate  on  the  EU’s  democratic  deficit  and  it’s  legitimacy 
problems.
  The  consequences  of  deepening  integration  have  not 
all been positive for parliamentary assemblies. In fact, early   
assessments  portrayed  national  parliaments  as ‘losers’  or 
‘victims’ of the European integration process.  The erosion of 
parliamentary control over the executive branch is coined as 
the ‘deparliamentarisation’ thesis. In the European context, 
‘deparliamentarisation’ is linked to three issues which are de-
scribed below: reduced national policy autonomy; a shift in 
the domestic executive-legislative balance; and information 
asymmetries. 
 
  The  transfer  of  competences  and  policy-making  to   
European institutions reduced the legislative remit of national 
parliaments, which is often confined to the transposition 
of European legislation. National parliaments in particular   
experienced a double marginalisation: their domestic pow-
ers were curtailed as a result of policy transfers to the EU; 
and it is particularly difficult to contribute to the policy level 
where  the  transferred  prerogatives  are  handled.  National   
executives  also  experienced  a  reduction  of  their  policy   
autonomy  as  a  result  of  integration  and  the  effects  of   
regulatory competition, but as central actors at the European 
bargaining table, they have secured a continued and pivotal 
role in (European) policy-making. 
  The domestic executive-legislative balance has also been 
influenced  by  European  integration.  There  is  the  above-
mentioned  structural  disadvantage  whereby  national 
legislatures have no representation in the EU and national 
executives  have  direct  access  to  European  decision- 
making.  The  technocratic  nature  of  European  policy- 
making  further  strengthens  the  executive  branch  and 
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The Role of National 
Parliaments in European 
Decision-Making
Theo Jans* and Sonia Piedrafita**
National parliaments can be considered as victims of the European integration process. National 
parliaments  ceded  legislative  powers  to  the  EU  and  often  lost  leverage  over  their  national 
executive  branch,  which  continued  to  play  a  central  role  in  EU  decision-making.  Different 
domestic  parliamentary  scrutiny  systems  have  been  established  to  enhance  parliamentary 
involvement and control over EU affairs. In 2006 the Barroso Commission provided an additional 
impetus for parliaments to get involved, by offering to transmit its policy proposals directly to 
national parliaments with an open invitation to comment on them. The Lisbon Treaty foresees 
the possibility that national parliaments carry out subsidiarity checks on policy proposals. This 
paper argues that the different national and European provisions for parliamentary involvement 
do not amount to much. However, if we consider the combined effect of the different avenues in a 
dynamic perspective, they might jointly trigger a reassertion of national parliamentary influence 
in the European policy process.its  bureaucrats  vis-à-vis  the  national  parliaments.  More-
over,  the  determination  of  national  positions  on  Euro-
pean  affairs  requires  extensive  administrative  coordina-
tion across policy levels (e.g. in federal systems) and across 
agencies  and  ministries.  National  parliaments  are  often 
poorly  equipped  to  monitor  and  participate  in  these   
important domestic coordination efforts.1
  The  executive  predominance  in  European  affairs  fuels 
important information asymmetries that put national par-
liaments  at  an  additional  disadvantage.  National  parlia-
ments do not have the same direct access to information 
and processing capacity as 
national  executives  in  re-
lation  to  European  affairs. 
The  information  deficit 
can further enable the ex-
ecutive  branch  to  operate 
without  much  parliamen-
tary  oversight. The ‘depar-
liamentalisation’ thesis paints a bleak picture of the many 
challenges  that  the  European  institutional  architecture 
sets  for  national  parliaments.  However,  national  par-
liaments  have  not  passively  resigned  to  a  role  of  idle 
bystanders.  National  parliaments  have  gradually  fought 
back and have tried to reassert their scrutiny and oversight 
capabilities in relation to European affairs.
  All  EU-27  national  parliaments  have  a  European 
Affairs  Committee  (EAC)  and  many  sectoral  standing 
committees  also  tackle  EU  policies.  Every  national 
parliament  has  put  in  place  scrutiny  procedures  to   
review  EU  documents  and  to  hold  national  executives   
accountable. The scope and the intensity of parliamentary 
scrutiny  vary  significantly  across  parliaments,  but  it 
has  at  least  raised  awareness  and  secured  a  stable  and 
continued  attention  for  EU  affairs  in  the  assemblies. 
National parliaments have also sought to act collectively, 
mainly through the creation in 1989 of the Conference of 
Community  and  European  Affairs  Committees  (COSAC).2 
COSAC convenes twice a year in the Member State holding 
the Presidency of the Council of the EU and brings together 
members of European affairs committees and a delegation 
of the European Parliament. COSAC provides a forum for the 
exchange of information and best practices on parliamentary 
involvement  in  the  EU.  The  COSAC  biannual  meeting 
conclusions  are  published  in  the  Official  Journal 
and are addressed to the European institutions. The political 
impact  of  COSAC  has  been  limited  but  the  increased   
exchange of information and the analysis of new windows 
of opportunity for national parliaments have prepared the 
ground for more influential COSAC actions.3
  In  addition  to  national  parliaments  noting  the 
increasing impact of European policy-making on their key 
legislative  functions,  the  European  institutions  have  also 
gradually acknowledged the need to bring national parlia-
ments back into the European policy process. Declaration 13   
annexed to the Maastricht Treaty was the first, albeit timid,   
step towards recognising the role of national parliaments, 
followed by a Protocol on the role of national parliaments 
in  the  European  Union  annexed  to  the Treaty  of  Amster-
dam,  all  of  which  has  eventually  culminated  in  a  direct 
role  for  national  parliaments  under  the  form  of  an ‘early 
warning’  system  provided  in  the  Lisbon  Treaty.  In  paral-
lel with the planned innovations in the Lisbon Treaty, the 
European  Commission  decided,  as  of  September  2006, 
to  transmit  all  new  proposals  and  consultation  papers   
directly to the national parliaments inviting them to react 
and to engage in a dialogue on its proposals. The different 
national  provisions  for  parliamentary  scrutiny  combined 
with the various treaty changes and political initiatives at the 
European level all seem to point towards a genuine window 
of opportunity for a more significant involvement of national 
parliaments  in  EU  policy-
making.
  In  the  first  part  of 
this  article,  we  will  re-
view  the  main  features 
of  parliamentary  scru-
tiny of EU documents and 
decisions across Member States, and will examine the impact 
of the 2006 Barroso initiative. The second part of the article 
will analyse to what extent the Lisbon Treaty might contrib-
ute towards reinforcing the role of national parliaments in 
EU governance in the future. 
Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Documents and Decisions
The German Bundesrat was the first national parliament to set 
up a European affairs committee (EAC) in 1957. The Belgian 
Chamber of Representatives and the Italian Senate created 
their EACs in 1962 and 1968 respectively. The parliaments 
of  the  first  accession  countries;  Denmark,  the  United 
Kingdom  and  Ireland,  due  in  part  to  more  Eurosceptical 
electorates  and  traditionally  strong  parliaments,  quickly 
established EACs to scrutinise European affairs.4 Today all 
national  parliaments  have  a  European  affairs  committee 
(altogether 36 EACs) and a system to scrutinise European 
documents  and  policies.  Although  there  is  a  clear 
convergence in the parliamentary scrutiny of EU documents 
and decisions, there is still a lot of diversity in how national 
parliaments approach EU affairs. Elements of variation and   
convergence can be discerned along the following issues: 
a.  Time frame and access to information
b.  European Affairs Committees and the organisation 
  of scrutiny
c.  Systems of parliamentary scrutiny
The Time Frame and Access to Information.
There has been a gradual effort to redress the information 
gap on EU affairs between national parliaments and the ex-
ecutives. Declaration 13 of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) fore-
saw in the non-binding commitment that “the governments 
of  the  Member  States  will ensure, inter alia,  that  national 
Parliaments  receive  Commission  proposals  for  legislation 
in good time for information or possible examination”. The 
Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European   
Union enforced in 1999 offered a binding arrangement and 
broadened the scope of the Commission documents to be 
forwarded to national parliaments to include consultation 
documents, but it also weakened the provisions of Declara-
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The dependency of national 
parliaments on government 
information has been reducedtion 13 by stipulating that “Commission proposals for leg-
islation... shall be made available in good time so that the 
government of each Member State may ensure that its own 
national parliament receives them as appropriate”. The Pro-
tocol still left it to national governments to transmit legis-
lative documents to their parliaments as they saw fit. Fur-
thermore, the protocol established a minimum period of six 
weeks  between  the  com-
munication of a legislative 
proposal  and  its  inclusion 
on  a  Council  agenda  for   
decision  in  order  to  grant 
national  parliaments  time 
to scrutinise the proposal.
  In  2006  the  Barroso 
Commission  announced 
that it would, even without 
treaty obligations, transmit 
all  new  proposals  and 
consultation papers directly 
to the national parliaments, 
inviting  them  to  react 
so  as  to  improve  policy 
formulation.5  The  Lisbon 
Treaty formalises the current practice of direct transmission 
to national parliaments. The new PNP broadens the list of 
documents  for  direct  transmission  (e.g.  Council  minutes 
and  agendas,  annual  legislative  programme  and  other 
instruments of legislative planning, etc.) and extends the 
period  between  publication  of  a  proposal  (in  all  official 
languages) and placement on a Council agenda for decision 
from six to eight weeks.
  The dependency of national parliaments on government 
information has clearly been reduced. All national parlia-
ments (will) receive all documents directly from the Euro-
pean institutions and they have a minimum of six weeks 
(following the Lisbon Treaty, eight weeks) to organise their 
scrutiny.  Many  parliaments  have  indicated  that  the  time 
frame is still rather short for a thorough review of legislative 
documents.6 Time constraints push parliaments to be selec-
tive in the documents that are scrutinised and to intensify 
their involvement in the preparatory stages through close 
monitoring of consultation documents and impact assess-
ments. The tendency to have early first reading agreements 
in codecision procedures is an additional reason for national 
parliaments to act quickly in order to have an impact on the 
European inter-institutional bargaining process.
European Affairs Committees 
and the Organisation of Scrutiny
There are many differences in the way national parliaments 
organise  the  scrutiny  of  EU  documents  and  decisions  in 
accordance  with  their  national  constitutional  and  legal   
provisions.  Variation  exists  regarding  the  mechanisms  to 
sift through the documents, the involvement of the sectoral 
committees, the frequency of European affairs committee 
(EAC) meetings and the participation of MEPs and civil society. 
The frequency of the meetings and the resources available 
are  becoming  increasingly  important  due  to  the 
growing  volume  of  documents  that  are  transmitted  to 
national  legislatures.  In  most  parliaments  the  EAC  is 
the  main  forum  for  dealing  with  European  issues,  with 
varying  levels  of  cooperation  with  Sectoral  Standing 
Committees  (SSCs).  In  some  parliaments,  for  instance  in 
Finland or Italy, the SSCs are responsible for the scrutiny 
of  European  issues  in  their  specific  policy  areas.  Both 
models  have  their  advantages  and  disadvantages.  EACs 
  may  lack  the  sectoral 
and  domain-specific 
  expertise,  although  this 
is  often  compensated 
through  the  input  of 
SSCs.  Putting  sectoral 
committees in charge of 
scrutiny  has  the  benefit 
of  mainstreaming  Euro-
pean  concerns  across 
parliament,  but  the  SSC 
may  lack  the  European 
institutional  expertise 
or  global  vision  on  EU 
affairs.7 
 
  The  participation  of  members  of  the  European  Parlia-
ment can positively contribute to the tasks of the national 
legislatures. In most of the national parliaments, MEPs may 
take  part  in  the  EAC’s  regular  meetings.  In  Belgium,  the   
Federal  Advisory  Committee  on  European  Affairs  is  com-
posed of members of both national chambers and eight 
MEPs. In the German Bundestag 15 MEPs are members of 
the EU Affairs Committee.8
Systems of Parliamentary Scrutiny
Based on a survey of the 40 national parliamentary cham-
bers, COSAC identified two main scrutiny models that are 
applied in the 27 Member States.9 One widespread type of 
scrutiny system is the document-based model, which focuses 
on sifting and examining all incoming EU documents (mostly 
Commission legislative proposals). The EACs or SSC prioritise 
and assess the documents requiring closer committee scru-
tiny. Document-based systems focus extensively on Com-
mission documents and less on the actual decision-making 
process in the Council of Ministers. The goal of document-
based scrutiny is not to systematically mandate Brussels-
bound ministers or to ensure a close monitoring of govern-
ment  positions  in  specific  inter-institutional  negotiations. 
The  document-based  models  emphasise  information-
processing and the development of parliamentary discus-
sions  and  positions.  Many  document-based  models  are 
accompanied by a scrutiny reserve which prescribes that 
ministers should not agree to an EU proposal before parlia-
mentary scrutiny is completed. The parliaments of the Uni-
ted Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, France, Germany, 
Italy,  Ireland,  Portugal,  Belgium,  the  Netherlands  (Eerste 
kamer),  Luxembourg  and  Bulgaria  have  document-based 
scrutiny systems.10 The absence of systematic mandates for 
government action in the document-based systems does 
not necessarily imply that these assemblies are without in-
fluence. Parliamentary committees often call upon govern-
ment ministers to clarify their views and positions. Moreover, 
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nsome assemblies have invested significantly in information 
gathering through (public) hearings and consultations and 
in producing many high-quality reviews and opinions, which 
are communicated to the executive and to the European 
Commission. For instance, the UK House of Lords and the 
French Senate have been particularly active in producing ex-
pert contributions which have received attention from their 
executives and the European institutions. 
  The  second  scrutiny  model  concerns  the  so-called 
mandating  or  procedural  system,  in  which  parliamentary 
attention  is  concentrated  on  the  government’s  position 
throughout the European decision-making process. Proce-
dural systems seek to ensure control over what the ministers 
agree to in Council meetings. Many parliaments with proce-
dural systems issue direct mandates to the ministers which 
may  set  the  bargaining  range  or  even  stipulate  explicit   
voting instructions.11 The parliaments of Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland (Sejm), Slovakia, Slovenia 
and Sweden have EACs which systematically provide man-
dates  for  government  ministers.12  Government  ministers 
are obliged to present their negotiation positions before the 
EAC, which may force the government to review its position. 
The Austrian and Hungarian parliaments also have mandat-
ing powers but use these less frequently. In most cases, the 
mandating  process  normally  takes  place  just  (one  week)   
prior  to  the  meetings  of  the  Council,  but  in  Finland  for   
instance, the process starts as soon as the Council working 
group begins examining the proposal. In most cases, the 
government  may  devi-
ate from the mandate for 
compelling reasons, but 
such  deviations  require 
justification  and  some-
times  a  new  consulta-
tion  with  parliament 
(e.g. Denmark, Austria).
  The  presence  of  mandating  powers  is  often  regarded 
as  an  indication  of  significant  parliamentary  influence.   
This argument needs to be qualified for two reasons. Firstly, 
the increased use of qualified majority voting in the Council 
limits national and parliamentary control over European ne-
gotiations and policy outcomes, even if binding parliamen-
tary mandates have been issued. Secondly, parliamentary 
majorities are unlikely to cause controversy by discarding 
proposed  government  negotiation  mandates,  especially 
when these divergent views may be exploited by opposition 
parties.
  A third category of so-called Informal Influencers,13 such 
as  Spain  or  Greece,  can  be  identified. These  parliaments 
focus on informal dialogue with the government and seek 
to have an influence through broad parliamentary debates 
on  European  affairs.14 They  do  not  organise  a  systematic 
scrutiny of EU documents or of the government position in 
the Council.
Recent Trends and the Barroso Initiative  
The distinction between document-based and mandating 
scrutiny systems is increasingly blurred as parliaments seem 
to converge towards more mixed systems. For instance, the 
Estonian, Hungarian, Lithuanian and Dutch (Tweede Kamer) 
parliaments  combine  elements  of  both  systems.15  Parlia-
ments  concentrating  on  document  scrutiny  have  started 
to organise hearings with ministers in order to monitor the 
government’s position more closely. Many parliaments with 
mandating systems have responded to the Barroso initiative 
of 2006 and intensified the document scrutiny and engaged 
in the formulation of opinions directly to the Commission.
  Almost all national parliaments, whether operating with 
document-based or mandating systems, still perceived their 
national government to be the main object of scrutiny and 
influence  in  2007.16  Parliamentary  efforts  are  still  mainly 
focused on the national level and few parliaments actively 
seek to influence the European institutions directly. In this 
regard, the Barroso initiative of 2006 to transmit Commis-
sion  documents  directly  to  national  parliaments  with  an 
open invitation to comment on the documents may herald 
a  re-orientation  of  national  parliamentary  initiatives  from 
the national towards the European level and the European 
Commission in particular.
  Since  September  2006  the  European  Commission  has 
received almost 450 opinions from 33 national assemblies 
of  24  Member  States.  The  frequency  of  parliamentary 
opinions seems to increase over time with 148 opinions in 
2007, 202 in 2008, and 82 for the period January-April 2009. 
The  Portuguese  Assembly,  Danish  Folketing,  the  Swedish 
Riksdag  and  a  number  of  second  chambers  (German 
Bundesrat, UK House of Lords, and the French and Czech 
Senate) have been 
among  the  most 
active  assemblies 
to carry out reviews 
of  Commission 
policy  documents. 
The  parliamentary 
opinions  dealt 
with subsidiarity issues (as part of coordinated subsidiarity 
exercises  organised  by  COSAC),  but  often  went  further 
and covered political issues related to the content of the 
Commission  proposals.17  Many  parliamentary  opinions 
elicited  a  reply  by  the  European  Commission  to  the 
parliaments. In fact, the Commission has delivered about 
98 replies to the parliamentary opinions.18 So far, there is no 
evidence that the Commission significantly altered its initial 
views and positions but it did deliver additional clarification 
and justification of its proposals following the parliamentary 
comments.  The  Commission’s  2006  initiative  offered 
national parliaments a direct channel for communication with 
the European Commission without having to consider their 
governments’ opinions. The initiative contributed to raising 
awareness  of  European  affairs  and  further  strengthened 
the scrutiny of documents within the national parliaments. 
Even if the parliamentary opinions did not lead to major 
policy changes, the comments were often reiterated in the 
European Parliament and by Member States in the Council.
National Parliaments in the Treaty of Lisbon
The  Treaty  on  European  Union  (TEU)  and  the  Treaty  on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provide for 
important  changes  of  direct  relevance  to  national  parlia-
ments. For the first time, national parliaments are mentioned 
and assigned specific roles in the body of the Treaty text. Na-
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National parliament were portrayed 
as ‘losers’ or ‘victims’
of European integrationtional parliaments are to ensure compliance with subsidi-
arity (Art. 5 TEU) and to contribute to the good functioning 
of the Union (Art. 12 TEU). With this objective, they are also 
given  some  prerogatives  in  the  EU  decision-making  pro-
cess. This part of the article will look into these prerogatives, 
especially the ‘early warning’ system for monitoring possible 
breaches of subsidiarity, as well as into the checks carried 
out so far by COSAC. 
New Prerogatives   
The  specific  rights  and  roles  envisaged  in  the  Lisbon 
Treaty for national parliaments include the following:
•	 The	 right	 to	 receive	 documents	 directly	 from	 the	  
  European institutions. The scope of the existing Protocol   
  on  National  Parliaments  (No.  1  in  the  new  Treaty)  is 
  broadened and includes all draft legislative acts, Council 
  agendas and minutes, annual and other instruments of 
  legislative planning and the Annual Report of the Court 
  of Auditors.
•	 An	 important	 role	 in	 ensuring	 compliance	 with	 the 
  subsidiarity  principle  based  on  an  entirely  rewritten 
  Subsidiarity  and  Proportionality  Protocol,  which 
  establishes  an  ‘early  warning’  system  for  monitoring 
  possible breaches of subsidiarity.
•	 Representation	of	national	parliaments	in	a	Convention 
  whose  purpose  is  to  formulate  recommendations  for 
  future Treaty revisions (ordinary Treaty revision procedure 
  Art. 48 (3) TEU).
•	 An	obligation	to	be	notified	by	the	European	Council 
  six months in advance of the intent to use the so-called 
  passerelle  (‘bridge’)  clauses,  moving  decision-making 
  from  unanimity  or  special  legislative  procedures  to 
  qualified majority voting or to the ordinary legislative 
  procedure.19  Moreover,  if  one  parliament  opposes  the 
  proposed decision-making change within the six month 
  period, the passerelle can not be carried out (Art. 48 (7) 
  TEU and Art. 81 (3) TFEU).
•	 Involvement	of	national	parliaments	in	the	evaluation	of 
  EU policies in the area of freedom, security and justice 
  (Art. 70 TFEU), in the evaluation of Eurojust’s activities   
  (Art. 85 TFEU), and in the scrutiny of Europol’s activities   
  (Art. 88 TFEU).
•	 Notification	to	national	parliaments	of	applications	made	  
  by European States for Union membership (Art. 49 TEU).
  The main innovation of the Lisbon Treaty concerns the 
redrafted Protocol (No. 2 in the new treaty) on the Applica-
tion of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality. The 
protocol maintains the existing provisions that any draft leg-
islative act must contain a detailed statement enabling the 
appraisal of its compliance with the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality, including:
a.  An assessment of the proposal’s financial impact and, in 
  the case of a directive, of its implications for the rules to be 
  put in place by Member States, including, where necessary, 
  the regional legislation. 
b.  The reasons for concluding that a Union objective can be 
   better achieved at Union level shall be substantiated by 
  qualitative and, wherever possible, quantitative indicators. 
  All draft legislative acts should comply with the propor-
tionality principle by taking into account the need for any 
burden, whether financial or administrative, falling upon the 
Union, national governments, regional or local authorities, 
economic operators and citizens, to be minimised and com-
mensurate with the objective to be achieved.
 
  Whereas  the  justification  of  legislative  drafts  needs 
to cover both the subsidiarity and the proportionality as-
pects of the proposals, the ‘early warning system’ or control 
mechanism for national parliaments only covers the subsidi-
arity dimension of the proposal. 
The ‘Early Warning’ Mechanism 
Within eight weeks any national parliament may submit a 
reasoned opinion stating why it considers that a draft legis-
lative act does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. 
Each national parliament has two votes and in the case of 
bicameral systems, each of the two chambers has one vote. 
In the EU 27, this means a total of 54 votes. Depending on 
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9the number of problematic reasoned opinions the protocol 
foresees two new procedures better known as ‘yellow and 
orange cards’. 
The ‘yellow card’ procedure entails that:
1.  at least 1/3 of the available votes (i.e. 18 votes out 54) 
  are  cast  against  the  draft  legislative  act    because  of 
  non-compliance with the subsidiarity principle. For draft 
  legislative acts concerning the area of freedom, security 
  and justice, the threshold is 1/4 of the votes (i.e. 14 out 
   of  54).  Following  such  a  ‘yellow  card’  the  initiating   
  institution (usually the EC) must review its proposal and   
  may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the draft but   
  must justify its decision.
The ‘orange card’ procedure only applies to the ordinary
legislative procedure (codecision) and entails that:
1.  if  the  reasoned  opinions  regarding  non-compliance 
  with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity  represent  at  least  a   
  simple majority of the votes allocated to national parlia- 
  ments (i.e. 28 out 54), the proposal for the legislative act   
  must be reviewed. Again the European Commission may   
  maintain, amend, or withdraw its proposal. If it decides to   
  maintain its proposal, it must provide justification.
2.  if the option is to maintain the proposal, the reasoned 
  opinions of the national parliaments and the Commission 
  are transmitted to the Union legislator, who must consider 
   the subsidiarity issues before the end of the first reading 
   stage. If, by a majority of 55% of the members of the   
  Council  or  a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  in  the  Euro- 
  pean  Parliament,  the  legislator  considers  the  proposal   
  incompatible with the subsidiarity principle, the proposal   
  will fail and will not receive further consideration.
  Most  national  parliaments  and  academic  observers   
  regard the new subsidiarity provisions as a useful innova-
tion, albeit one whose importance should not be overstated.   
The subsidiarity mechanism does not apply to implementing 
legislation resulting from comitology procedures nor does it 
cover the exclusive competencies or the areas in which the 
EU operates primarily in a coordinating capacity (e.g. open 
methods of coordination). Moreover, the European Commis-
sion can maintain its position without further consequence 
under the ‘yellow card’ procedure. The threshold for the more 
stringent ‘orange card’ procedure is high and may seldom be 
invoked: in the end, it is the EU legislators, not the national 
parliaments, who have the last word.
 
Experience in the Framework of COSAC
In order to test the challenges and overall feasibility of the 
‘early warning’ system, COSAC has carried out a number of 
trial runs since 2006. The subsidiarity checks have shown 
rather high and steadily increasing parliamentary response 
rates, involving up to 33 national parliaments or parliamen-
tary chambers (out of 40) from 23 member states in 2008.21 
Experiences with the subsidiarity checks have so far identi-
fied a number of recurrent difficulties and limitations:
•	 the	time	limit	of	eight	weeks	is	considered	to	be	too		
  short a time frame to conduct a substantive subsidiarity 
  check;
•	 parliaments	find	it	particularly	difficult	to	distinguish 
  subsidiarity issues from proportionality concerns (not 
  covered by the yellow and orange procedures) and 
  from substantive examinations of the policy content 
  of the proposals;
•	 overall,	few	parliaments	identified	significant	non 
  compliance problems in the subsidiarity checks. 
  The subsidiarity perspective appears to be too narrow 
  to block a legislative draft; more often parliaments take 
  issue with proportionality, the legal basis or the content 
  of the proposal, but these aspects are not covered by 
  the subsidiarity check. 
  National  parliaments  have  noted  that  the  subsidiarity 
mechanism will not be a miracle cure against over-regulation 
or the loss of legislative power that parliaments may have 
suffered in the course of European integration. Nevertheless, 
the  subsidiarity  checks  have  provided  parliaments  with   
incentives  to  consider  European  policy  initiatives  early 
on  in  the  process,  by  reviewing  the  EC  Annual  Policy 
Strategy and Commision Legislative and Work Programme, 
in  order  to  maximise  their  chances  to  meet  the  eight 
week deadline. The thresholds for the ‘yellow and orange 
cards’  have  underscored  the  need  for  greater  interpar-
liamentary  cooperation  in  order  to  establish  a  common 
interpretation of subsidiarity and in order to improve the   
exchange of the various parliamentary contributions (via the 
IPEX database and website). 
Conclusions
Throughout this article we have examined both the current 
avenues for national parliaments to participate in the Euro-
pean policy process as well as those that the Lisbon Treaty 
might bring in. Firstly, the national parliament scrutiny mod-
els, whether document based or mandate based, primarily 
target the domestic executive branch and seek, to varying 
degrees, to influence the government’s position in the Coun-
cil. Secondly, the Barroso Commission has opened a direct 
dialogue with the national parliaments, which are invited to 
engage directly on the supranational level via opinions on 
policy proposals addressed to the Commission. Thirdly, the 
Lisbon Treaty provides a treaty-based access point for na-
tional parliaments to monitor compliance with the subsidi-
arity principle. 
  Assessed  separately,  and  on  their  independent  merits, 
the different avenues are unlikely to trigger a fundamental 
reassertion  of  national  parliamentary  influence  in  the 
European  policy  process.  National  scrutiny  systems 
sometimes  lack  the  resources,  the  mechanisms  or  the 
incentives  to  effectively  influence  national  governments’ 
actions in the EU, and even stringent mandating systems 
lose a lot of bite in the face of firm majority governments. 
The direct dialogue of the Barroso Commission has not led 
to significant and discernable changes in EC policy proposals 
or  outcomes.  For  national  parliaments  to  find  sufficient 
contestable  issues  on  the  grounds  of  subsidiarity  and  to 
reach the required thresholds to produce a yellow or orange 
card may also prove very difficult and rare. 
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ferent avenues in a dynamic perspective, they might jointly 
trigger  a  reassertion  of  national  parliamentary  influence 
in  the  European  policy  process.  The  subsidiarity  clauses, 
the eight week time frame and the broader scope of the 
documents to be received, all envisaged in the Lisbon Trea-
ty, will stimulate an early involvement of parliaments at the 
planning and preparatory stages of European policy formu-
lation  and  will  reduce  existing  information  asymmetries. 
The  Barroso  initiative  already  encourages  parliamentary 
scrutiny  of  these  preparatory  EC  work  programmes,  con-
sultation  documents  and  communications  and  broadens 
the scrutiny process to include other questions beyond sub-
sidiarity. National parliaments are encouraged to participate 
at an earlier stage, on the basis of more information and 
direct exchanges with the EC, and with the possibility of 
their concerns being raised not only in front of their govern-
ments but also in the EU.  All of these issues constitute in-
centives for national parliaments to improve their scrutiny 
systems in order to deal with their new prerogatives.
  Increasing  interparliamentary  cooperation  might  re- 
inforce the exchange of best practices and the joint use of 
resources, and could become the means to make the shadow 
of a collective action (yellow and orange cards) more effective. 
All  this  will  eventually  strengthen  the  position  of  parlia-
ments  in  relation  to  the  executive  branch  and  will  also 
improve parliamentary control over both the executive and 
EC initiatives. 
  A  fundamental  question  that  underlies  the  different 
treaty and procedural innovations is how the members of 
parliament (MPs) in the Member States will respond to the 
new opportunities. Raunio points out that MPs have their 
hands full even without engaging in EU affairs. If their main 
concerns are re-election and direct policy influence, the in-
depth scrutiny of European proposals may not be very at-
tractive to them.22 The ability of individual MPs to influence 
European policies is extremely limited and a strong focus on 
EU affairs may not be instrumental in attracting voters. One 
can only hope that ‘l’appétit s’acroit en mangeant’, or that MPs 
develop a taste and increased interest in European issues. 
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